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Abstract
Research typically presumes that people believe misinformation and propagate it through their social networks. Yet, a
wide range of motivations for sharing misinformation might impact its spread, as well as people’s belief of it. By exam-
ining research on motivations for sharing news information generally, and misinformation specifically, we derive a range
of motivations that broaden current understandings of the sharing of misinformation to include factors that may to some
extentmitigate the presumed dangers ofmisinformation for society. To illustrate the utility of our viewpoint we report data
from a preliminary study of people’s dis/belief reactions to misinformation shared on social media using natural language
processing. Analyses of over 2,5 million comments demonstrate that misinformation on social media is often disbelieved.
These insights are leveraged to propose directions for future research that incorporate a more inclusive understanding of
the various motivations and strategies for sharing misinformation socially in large-scale online networks.
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1. Introduction
Few would dispute that the web has grownmore wicked
in recent years with the rise of ‘fake news.’ Indeed, the
creation and spread ofmisinformation online for political
or financial gain presents one of the greatest challenges
to democratic society in modern history. Fake news and
misinformation are said to increase political polariza-
tion, alter voters’ perceptions of candidates and issues,
and erode trust in critical democratic institutions (Allcott
& Gentzkow, 2017; Ciampaglia, Mantzarlis, Maus, &
Menczer, 2018; Hochschild & Einstein, 2015). Moreover,
propelled largely through social media, fake news has
been shown to spread faster and further than ‘real’ news
(Lazer et al., 2018; Vosoughi, Roy, & Aral, 2018).
The danger of misinformation is that people will find
such information to be credible. Fake news is thought
to be dangerous because people are likely to believe
the false information, and because it is spread through
people’s trusted contacts via social media, it will be sim-
ilarly trusted by others. Hence, the presumed threat
of fake news is that people will erroneously believe
false information they encounter and that they will
in turn propagate misinformation to others. Yet, there
are likely many motivations for sharing information—
including fake news—within one’s social network that
might impact both its spread and people’s belief of
it. For example, people might share misinformation for
entertainment purposes, sarcastic reasons, or to illus-
trate a point counter to the message promoted in a false
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news story. Under such circumstances, the danger of
fake news may be less than feared or, perhaps, even mit-
igated or reversed.
This article interrogates common presumptions
about sharing misinformation by analyzing people’s
motives for sharing fake news stories on social media.
Drawing on literatures on news sharing, rumors, gos-
sip, and urban legends suggests that a wide range of
motivations exists for sharing misinformation, and that
variousmotivations imply both positive and negative out-
comes for democratic processes. Preliminary data from
a research program that aims to understand dis/belief
in fake news and misinformation in social media are
then presented as proof-of-concept for some of the
ideas about motives for sharing misinformation that are
advanced in this article.
2. Motivations for Sharing News Information
Research on people’s motivations to share news in
general, and specifically via social media, is extensive.
Motives for sharing news include: acting as an opinion
leader, advocating for one’s own beliefs, socializing, gain-
ing social status, sharing experiences with others, and
informing others. Although the news media decide which
stories to publish, users make judgments about the value
of what is published, which in turn affects news consump-
tion. Through such processes of ‘secondary gatekeeping,’
whereby users share news storieswith others (Shoemaker
& Vos, 2009; Singer, 2014), information consumers pro-
posewhat others should read, establishing “not onlywhat
is valuable to them as individuals but also what they
believewill be important, interesting, entertaining, or use-
ful to others” (Singer, 2014, p. 58). In this way, users filter,
evaluate, and finally share news information.
This secondary gatekeeping capability has been
enhanced by social media, where individuals are able
to actively participate in the dissemination of news to
large audiences. Indeed, users may experience a sense
of agency when sharing news on social media by feeling
that they have some control over what is posted on a
social network (Oeldorf-Hirsch & Sundar, 2015). In this
sense, the desire to act as a gatekeeper of informa-
tion or an opinion leader may be a fundamental motiva-
tion for news sharing. Indeed, research has found that
self-perceptions of opinion leadership influence users’
news sharing intention (Ma, Sian Lee, & Hoe-Lian Goh,
2014) and that political expression enhances people’s
motivations to self-present as politically active on social
media (Lane et al., 2019). Moreover, users may feel
motivated to share news that supports their own views
and contradicts dissenting beliefs since advocating for
one’s own beliefs can be a motivator of news sharing
(Dafonte-Gómez, 2018), consistent with evidence of a
relationship between news sharing and ideology spread-
ing (Lottridge & Bentley, 2018).
In addition, studies have found that social gratifica-
tions and social status are motivators of news sharing
on social media (Bright, 2016; Choi, 2016; Lee & Ma,
2012). A sense of connection with the online commu-
nity is developed through news sharing (Lee &Ma, 2012)
and sharing information with others contributes to satis-
fying the need for social interaction, which “helps peo-
ple clarify their opinions, and gives them an opportunity
to work out their personal positions relative to media
content” (Weeks & Holbert, 2013, p. 215). Additionally,
social standing can be achieved by sharing news deemed
useful to those receiving it, which can “make the per-
son passing it on appear well informed and intelligent”
(Bright, 2016, p. 346). News sharing may thus help peo-
ple gain status among peers (Bruns, 2018; Choi, 2016;
Lee & Ma, 2012), particularly if they feel that they were
informed earlier than others (Kubey & Peluso, 1990).
In some cases, sharing news may be a by-product of
people’s psychological need to share experiences with
others (Harber & Cohen, 2005; Kubey & Peluso, 1990),
consistent with the notion that people who have expe-
rienced disturbing events are emotionally compelled to
share their experiences: “An unintended but often real
consequence of their efforts to unburden themselves,
we believe, is to inform members of their social net-
works of valuable news” (Harber & Cohen, 2005, p. 383).
In this way, people may share news to relieve their own
feelings (Kubey & Peluso, 1990). This emotional compo-
nent of news sharing has been examined by researchers
who found that emotional arousal can explain transmis-
sion of news (Berger & Milkman, 2012; Dafonte-Gómez,
2018), such that news evoking high-arousal positive or
negative emotions is shared more than news evoking
low-arousal emotions.
Finally, researchers have also identified altruis-
tic motives for news sharing (Bruns, 2018; Chadwick
& Vaccari, 2019; Dafonte-Gómez, 2018; Kümpel,
Karnowski, & Keyling, 2015). For example, surveys
among U.K. social media users found that “to inform oth-
ers” and “to express my feelings” were the most impor-
tant motivations for news sharing (Chadwick & Vaccari,
2019). Users feel motivated to serve others’ information
needs and share meaningful news with their online com-
munity, to such a degree that social media users are even
prone to adapt news sharing to their audience’s interests
(Rudat, Buder, & Hesse, 2014).
3. Motivations for Sharing Misinformation
While plenty of research exists on why people share
news online, only a handful of studies have examined
people’s motivations for sharing ‘fake’ news stories (e.g.,
Chadwick & Vaccari, 2019; Chen & Sin, 2013; Chen, Sin,
Theng, & Lee, 2015; Duffy, Tandoc, & Ling, 2019; Talwar,
Dhir, Kaur, Zafar, & Alrasheedy, 2019). Moreover, most
studies assume that people do not realize the informa-
tion they share is false—in other words, that the sharing
of misinformation, including fake news, is unintentional.
The picture is more complicated with misinforma-
tion, however, because people may or may not know
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the information is false when they share it, and thus
may spread the misinformation either intentionally or
unintentionally (Lawrie, 2019). Unintentional fake news
sharing may be motivated by self-expression and social-
ization (Chen et al., 2015). For instance, Chen and Sin
(2013) found that people sharemisinformationmainly to
obtain other’s opinions, to express their own opinions,
and to interact with others. Similarly, researchers have
suggested that the motivation to build relationships can
lead people to unintentionally share fake news (Duffy
et al., 2019). In fact, the factors that drive people to share
real news, including emotional impact and relevance, are
likely to be the same factors that make fake news highly
shared as well (Duffy et al., 2019).
However, when the sharer knows the information
is false, then other motives likely come into play.
Researchers suggest that people knowingly share fake
news because it conforms to their prior views and in
order to maintain positive social relations (Duffy et al.,
2019). Intentional fake news sharing has been posi-
tively associated with social media use behaviors such
as self-disclosure, online trust, fear of missing out, and
social media fatigue (Talwar et al., 2019). More specifi-
cally, people who tend to disclose more information in
social media generally, those who receive a fake news
item from a trusted source, people who seek popularity
and a sense of belonging (i.e., fear social exclusion), and
who experience information overload are more likely to
pass fake news on to others in their social networks.
In addition, research shows that people who seek to
entertain, troll, or debate with others are more likely to
engage in intentionalmisinformation sharing, while those
who seek to persuade or informothers are less likely to do
so (Chadwick, Vaccari, & O’Loughlin, 2018). This suggests
that some people share fake news as a way to disrupt
political dialogue, while others with more civic incentives
share fake news as part of legitimate political debate:
Those motivated to debate may see sharing problem-
atic news as a cultural norm; a practice that is simply
part of ‘what it takes’ to engage politically on social
media in order to attract attention and nudge others
to take positions. (Chadwick et al., 2018, p. 4269)
Among participants in the study, 8.9% admitted to shar-
ing news that they thought was made up when they
shared it and 17.1% deliberately shared news that was
exaggerated. Another study showed that 17.3% of British
news sharers on social media knowingly shared news
that they thought was made up (Chadwick & Vaccari,
2019). Similarly, a Pew Research Center survey found
14% of U.S. adults said they had shared a news story they
knewwas fake (Barthel,Mitchell, & Holcomb, 2016). And
sharing fake news may be underreported due to social
desirability biases that likely suppress self-reported data
on misinformation sharing.
Finally, fake news sharing has some similarities to
rumor, gossip, and urban legends. Research by Guerin
and Miyazaki (2006), for instance, suggests “the primary
function of telling rumors, gossip, and urban legends is
not to impart information to the listener or alleviate lis-
tener anxiety about the topic, but to entertain or keep
the listener’s attention, thereby enhancing social rela-
tionships” (p. 23). Others have argued that both rumor
sharing and fake news sharing fulfill three motivations:
“To cope with uncertainty, build relationships, and for
self-enhancement” (Duffy et al., 2019, p. 3). In this fash-
ion, people engage in rumor as a way to collectively
reduce uncertainty, enhance interpersonal relationships,
and feel positive about themselves (Bordia & DiFonzo,
2005), as may be the case with sharing news misinfor-
mation as well.
4. Broadening the Range of Motivations for Sharing
Misinformation
There is still much to be learned about why people share
misinformation. Theoretical explanations are nascent,
and only a few empirical studies have been conducted
to date (Talwar et al., 2019). There is certainly a host
of reasons in addition to those discussed above why
people share fake news and misinformation. For exam-
ple, intentionally sharingmisinformationmay be done to
engage in ‘collective fact-checking,’ which likely derives
from the more general motivation for uncertainty reduc-
tion in information sharing as mentioned earlier. Fake
news stories can be sensationalistic and often contain
other elements such as extreme partisan information
that could arouse suspicion about their veracity (Mourão
& Robertson, 2019). Consequently, recipients of such
stories may share the suspected misinformation with
their friends and followers on social media in an effort
to crowdsource its truthfulness, and thus reduce uncer-
tainty as to the information’s credibility.
Another potential consequence of the sensational-
ism of many fake news stories is that their absurdity
can provide fodder for ridicule. Sarcasm or mockery of
such stories may therefore be another reason to share
news that one knows is false. This reason could be con-
ceived as a specialized subset of sharing for socializing
and entertainment purposes. In such cases, the misinfor-
mation is shared for the purpose of highlighting its falsity
to others. This is different type of social entertainment
motive than passing a story to a friend you think would
find it interesting or spreading a titillating rumor for its
shock value, which have been discussed previously in the
news sharing literature (Lee&Ma; 2012; see also Kümpel
et al., 2015).
A motivation that ultimately shares the same pur-
pose as sarcasm is sharing misinformation for edu-
cational purposes. Although ‘informing others’ is a
well-known reason for sharing news information (e.g.,
Chadwick & Vaccari, 2019), our concept of education
differs from prior notions of imparting information to
others because it is not about informing recipients of
the content of the story, but rather about informing
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them about the credibility of the story itself. Such shar-
ing thus functions to debunk misinformation, and serves
as a warning to others not to believe the information.
Alerting recipients to potential misinformationmay stem
from simple altruistic motives, or may be self-serving if it
is done to demonstrate one’s moral or intellectual supe-
riority. If the latter, it may be a new variant of the ‘status
seeking’ category of news sharingmotives, as it casts the
sharer as a well-informed opinion leader.
Thus, while social media users share fake news that
they do not know or suspect to be false for the same
reasons that they share any other type of news, there
exist motivations that are unique to sharing misinforma-
tion that one knows to be false. An important issue that
has not been explored is that a person’s motivation for
sharing information is likely to have a strong impact on
the credibility beliefs of the recipient. If a sharer appears
to believe the information they share, the recipient may
also. Yet, if a sharer appears not to believe the informa-
tion (for instance, if the information is shared for sarcas-
tic or educational purposes), the recipientmay not either.
But how can the recipient know what a sharer believes?
Although another person’s psychological motivation
for sharing a piece of information and his or her credi-
bility evaluation might be difficult for recipients to dis-
cern in many cases, the communication surrounding the
shared information can offer useful clues. For example,
a prominent fake news story shared on social media in
2016 said “Pope Francis Shocks World, Endorses Donald
Trump for President.” On social media, this post could be
accompanied by various captions or comments that may
signal different degrees of belief in the misinformation.
For example, if the sharerwere towrite: “See, this proves
I was right all along, I knew he would support Trump!”
or even “Oh no, this is awful!” this might signal that the
sharer finds the information to be credible. On the other
hand, if the commentary instead read: “Oh yeah right,
sure he did,” or “Get a load of this, it’s the funniest thing
I’ve seen in a long time!” or “What kind of dope would
believe this bull****???” it would indicate skepticism or
disbelief on the part of the sharer (Figure 1).
Recent research supports the assertion that recipi-
ents of information notice cues regarding credibility from
sharers. A study by Colliander (2019) found that expo-
sure to others’ comments that were critical versus sup-
portive of a fake news story resulted in less favorable
attitudes toward the news article, prompted participants
to write more negative comments themselves about the
article, and lowered their intentions to share the arti-
cle in their social networks. Colliander concluded that
“social media users seem to use the comments of other
people as a guide for how to respond to disinformation
online” (p. 208) based on human psychological tenden-
cies toward conformity and a desire to maintain a pos-
itive self-concept. Winter, Bruckner, and Krämer (2015)
observed similar social influence effects of negatively—
versus positively-valenced mainstream news comments.
The foregoing discussion raises the possibility that
the danger to democracy and to society due to misin-
formation and fake news circulating in social media may
be mitigated at least partially to the extent that people
spread fake news stories as a tool to engage with others
in deliberative communication about its truthfulness or
to signal its falsity. As U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis
Brandeis famously wrote, the remedy to ‘bad’ speech is
not censorship, it is more speech, because through dis-
cussion and debate false information will be revealed as
false. Sharing misinformation for purposes such as col-
lective fact-checking, sarcasm, or education calls out the
information as false, and thus may be good for delib-
erative democracy. In this way, and borrowing a term
from van Heekeren (2020), social media commentary
surrounding misinformation may function as a ‘curative’
to the problem of fake news, particularly over time as
people reap the benefits of the collective sharing and
debunking of misinformation.
To illustrate this potential, a preliminary study is next
described in which the content of the communication
surrounding misinformation is analyzed to gain insight
into the range of reasons that people propagate such
information, and how it may over time alter information
interpretation. More specifically this research analyzed
social media users’ commentary on known fake news sto-
ries as a means to better understand public perceptions
of dis/belief in, and credibility assessments of, misinfor-
mation shared online.
Figure 1. Example of a fake news post with examples of hypothetical commentary that signal a range of beliefs by the
sharer. Source: “Pope Francis shocks world” (2016).
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5. Preliminary Study of Dis/Belief in Misinformation
Shared in Social Media
This study aimed to quantify the prevalence of dis/belief
in misinformation at scale using a machine learning
approach. The research was conducted in four steps.
Step 1 involved identifying social media posts that con-
tain misinformation and collecting user comments in
response to those posts to analyze. Step 2 required read-
ing the comments to determine if they reflect the com-
menter’s belief or disbelief in the misinformation. Each
comment was manually labeled by independent coders,
and these data were used in Step 3 to examine language
differences in comments expressing belief and disbelief,
and to test if such differences could be used to build a
classifier to identify dis/belief with reasonable accuracy.
Finally, the classifier was leveraged in Step 4 to measure
dis/belief at scale to answer the following RQs:
RQ1: To what extent does the public believe misinfor-
mation shared via social media?
If misinformation is not believed to a large extent, that
would discount much of its presumed danger to society.
And if evidence of disbelief is found in comments shared
by users, there is potential for those comments to influ-
ence others’ beliefs in a cascading manner:
RQ2: Is there is a time effect for expressed disbelief
in misinformation, where the public gradually realizes
the truth after a false claim is made, and therefore
belief in false claims decreases over time?
This question is raised in light of possibilities of crowd-
sourcing for misinformation detection, including via
formal reporting mechanisms (i.e., letting users flag
fake news; see Tschiatschek, Singla, Gomez Rodriguez,
Merchant, & Krause, 2018) or by the social influence
processes proposed herein, whereby recipients are influ-
enced by sharers’ critical comments on fake news stories.
While the technical details of the research are presented
in full elsewhere (citation blinded for review), the meth-
ods employed and research results at each step are sum-
marized in the next section.
5.1. Step 1
A sample of social media posts containing at least
some misinformation was collected from a census of
PolitiFact’s fact-checked articles between January 1 to
June 1, 2019. Posts were manually identified as contain-
ing misinformation that originated from Twitter, which
was used because its API allowed the collection of user
comments written in response to posts containing mis-
information at the time of data collection, unlike other
social media platforms. Next, comments (i.e., tweets)
in response to the posts were collected. Using the fact-
checked posts as seeds, a 1% sample of the tweet stream
was queried to capture all comments to the seed posts.
To reduce noise, only posts that had > 50 comments
were retained, which resulted in 6,809 comments to ana-
lyze in Step 2.
5.2. Step 2
Once the commentswritten in response to posts contain-
ing misinformation were collected, they were manually
annotated with belief and disbelief labels. Two indepen-
dent, trained coders read each comment and provided a
binary label: either disbelief (i.e., the person who wrote
the comment does not appear to believe themisinforma-
tion) or belief (i.e., the person who wrote the comment
does appear to believe the misinformation). These two
labels are mutually exclusive but not necessarily com-
plementary, that is, although a tweet is not expected to
show both belief and disbelief, it can show neither.
The inter-annotator percent agreement (i.e., the
number of agreed labels over the total count) was
used to evaluate intercoder reliability. 66.7% of the
coder pairs were above 80% agreement, 88.9% were
above 70% agreement, and only two were below 60%
agreement, suggesting an acceptable level of agreement
among annotators, especially for a relatively subjective
task. To obtain a final label for each comment, a third
independent coder read through all cases where the
two original coders disagreed and provided a final tie-
breaking judgement. Out of 6,809 tweets, 2,399 (35.2%)
were labeled as expressing disbelief, 1,282 (18.8%) were
labeled as expressing belief, 3,128 (45.9%) were labeled
as neither, and none (0%) were labeled as both.
5.3. Step 3
Using the labeled dataset, a lexicon-based exploratory
analysis of the language used across the comments
expressing belief and disbelief was conducted. Two lex-
icons were employed: (a) LIWC (Tausczik & Pennebaker,
2010), the most widely-used lexicon for understanding
psychometric properties of language, and (b) ComLex
(Jiang & Wilson, 2018), a more contextual lexicon built
from social media comments to misinformation, con-
taining additional domain-specific categories, e.g., ‘fake,’
‘fact,’ ‘hate speech.’ This technique provided a frequency
for each category in the lexicon, which allowed a com-
parison of the distributions of language frequencies
between comments expressing belief, disbelief, and nei-
ther by performing t-tests with Bonferroni corrections.
Results showed that comments expressing disbelief
contained significantly more falsehood awareness lan-
guage, including referrals to falsehood such as ‘lie, pro-
paganda’ and ‘fake, false’; referrals to the truth ‘fact,
research’; and negative character portraits such as ‘liar,
crook’ and ‘stupid, dumb.’ Comments expressing disbe-
lief also contained more negative emotions and nega-
tion (e.g., ‘no, not’) and less positive emotions and
discrepancy words (e.g., ‘should, would’). By contrast,
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comments expressing belief contained fewer falsehood
awareness signals (e.g., ‘fake, false’) and negative char-
acter portrait (‘stupid, dumb’). Comments expressing
belief also contained more exclamation (e.g., exclama-
tion marks, ‘!, yay’); discrepancy words; and fewer neg-
ative reactions such as swearing (e.g., ‘damn, fuck’) and
anger (e.g., ‘hate, kill’). All t-tests were significant at least
p < .01.
Next, natural language processing models were
applied to build a classifier to automatically identify and
label comments that express dis/belief in misinforma-
tion. Different types of classifiers were experimented
with and the neural transfer-learning based classifier
RoBERTa was found to be the best in terms of accuracy
of classification, as determined by F1 scores (binary F1
scores were around 0.86 for disbelief and 0.80 for belief).
5.4. Step 4
The final step was to use the classifier on a larger
dataset to label dis/belief expressed in responses to mis-
information at scale. The dataset, collected previously
by Jiang and Wilson (2018), contained 1,672,687 com-
ments collected from Facebook, 113,687 from Twitter,
and 828,000 from YouTube written in response to 5,303
fact-checked claims. These claims are drawn from the
entire archive of Snopes and PolitiFact’s articles between
their founding and January 9, 2018. The dataset was fed
to the RoBERTa-based classifier from Step 3 to answer
the research questions.
RQ1 asked about the prevalence of dis/belief inmisin-
formation. To analyze this, all of the original claims were
parsed into three mis/information types: (a) true, if the
claimswere rated as ‘true’ by Snopes or PolitiFact—these
claims contain nomisinformation; (b)mixed, if the claims
were rated as ‘mostly true,’ ‘half true,’ or ‘mixed’—these
claims contain somemisinformation but also some truth;
and (c) false, if the claims were rated as ‘mostly false,’
‘false,’ or ‘pants on fire!’—these claims contain mostly
falsehood. Comments in the dataset that were posted
after its corresponding factcheck article was published
were then filtered out. Finally, the remaining comments
were grouped by the mis/information type, and their
dis/belief labels were averaged.
Results showed that as the veracity of claims
decreased, disbelief increased while belief decreased
(Figure 2). Specifically, 12%, 14%, and 15% of comments
expressed disbelief in response to true, mixed, and false
claims, respectively; whereas 26%, 21%, and 20% of com-
ments expressed belief in response to true, mixed, and
false claims, respectively.
Notably, the majority of comments indicated no sure
indication of belief or disbelief and therefore yield no
information regarding people’s reactions to the claims
spread via social media. Among comments indicating
dis/belief, however, several implications emerge. First,
an overall skepticism is evident from the data: not only
do many people not believe fake information, but many
people similarly disbelieve (12%) true information (and
only 26% report believing true information). Thus, peo-
ple appear generally distrustful of claims shared via
social media in this study, suggesting a certain level of
cautiousness that might guard against the deleterious
effects of misinformation, consistent with the underly-
ing rationale that not all misinformation is uniformly
harmful. One potential explanation is that the parti-
san environment drives people to suspect any claims
from the opposite ideological group regardless of verac-
ity (Hochschild & Einstein, 2015). Another, though less
likely, explanation is that people tend to be skeptical of
all claims in social media, even when the claim is consis-
tent with existing facts. Both explanations warrant fur-
ther investigation.
Second, there is some indication that a portion of
people commenting on misinformation are doing so to
express their own disbelief in the content. This again sup-
ports the perspective that not all misinformation sharing
implies tacit endorsement of the claims made therein,
and provides evidence that at least some users are lever-
aging the power of social media in a fashion that can
serve as a partial corrective to misinformation. If users
are indicating that they do not believe the misinforma-
tion they see in social media, it suggests alternative, and
perhaps useful, responses regarding content that is in
turn shared with others.
That said, the difference in the prevalence of
dis/belief across the mis/information types is small

































Figure 2. Prevalence of dis/belief for true, mixed, and false claims on social media. Notes: For disbelief (left graph), as the
veracity of the claims decreases, the prevalence of expressed disbelief increases. For belief (right graph), as the veracity of
the claims decreases, the prevalence of expressed belief also decreases.
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statements). Yet, at scale, even small differences repre-
sent a substantial volume of occurrences where people
are more likely to disbelieve versus believe false claims.
Moreover, taken alone, the fact that in this study 15% of
users report not believing misinformation is notable.
The final analysis sought to answer RQ2, which
asked whether belief in false claims decreases over time.
The data revealed a very small-time effect, where disbe-
lief increases 0.001% and belief decreases 0.002% per
day after the initial false claim appeared. Notably, at
scale this small-time effect would yield a large number
of changes in dis/belief. This effect could be a result of
seeing prior comments that are critical of the claim (i.e.,
a sharer’s expressed disbelief in the misinformation),
but further studies that move beyond machine learning
techniques are needed to determine if this explanation
is correct.
For example, social scientific methodologies such
as surveys would be useful to elicit the variety of rea-
sons why people share misinformation that they know
to be false in social media, how often they accompany
it with commentary signaling its veracity, and also the
extent that social media users report receiving such
information from their network contacts. Experiments
similar to Colliander (2019) could shed light on the
power of negative comments to alter recipients’ credibil-
ity beliefs, especially if conducted unobtrusively where
actual behavioral data (e.g., misinformation sharing)
could be observed.
In sum, the results of our preliminary study show
evidence that when people share misinformation via
social media, they do not always take it at face value.
For example, over a third of the comments analyzed
in Step 2 reflected disbelief in tweets containing mis-
information, and the wider analysis in Step 4 revealed
that about one in six people disbelieved false informa-
tion they encountered in various social media platforms.
Moreover, our analyses found that belief in false claims
decreases slightly over time, which might at least partly
be a result of exposure to social comments critical of
the misinformation, although future research will need
to confirm this potential explanation. These data should
prompt scholars to expand their thinking on why peo-
ple share misinformation beyond unintentional sharing
of (believed) misinformation, to suggest a healthy pro-
cess of intentional social debunking of fake news that is
rarely examined in the literature.
6. Conclusion
Although the creation and spread of misinformation
online represent a serious challenge to democratic soci-
ety, the nature and extent of the problemmight to some
degree be overstated. If, as our preliminary evidence
suggests, misinformation on social media is often dis-
believed, and to the extent that those sharing it are
doing so for reasons that expose and help to stem the
spread of misinformation, then shared misinformation
is in fact not universally harmful and its propagation is
not always and necessarily detrimental. By examining
research on motivations for sharing news information
generally, and misinformation specifically, we derive a
range ofmotivations—including entertainment, sarcasm,
and education—that broaden our understanding of the
sharing of misinformation to include factors that may
help to mitigate its danger.
Yet, because research to date has almost exclusively
characterized information sharers as passive diffusers of
misinformation, and information consumers as univer-
sally receptive to it, little is known about the prevalence
and dynamics of information consumers’ potentially
defensive or constructive reactions to misinformation.
To address this deficiency research must consider a host
of factors that consider the sharing and consumption
of misinformation as a more active, critical, and strate-
gic process. For instance, future research is required to
establish baseline data on the wide range of motivations
invoked by those sharing misinformation, the extent to
which they are aware of its in/accuracy, and the degree
of intentionality in its sharing with others.
Relatedly, research must assess the extent to which
misinformation that is shared with the intention of
debunking it is in fact interpreted appropriately, and
the degree to which social, psychological, and contex-
tual factors affect such outcomes. Moreover, the com-
plex network dynamics of social media information shar-
ing (e.g., which network nodes are most influential, in
what domains), coupled with the relational attributes
that guide the mis/interpretation of shared misinforma-
tion (e.g., the relations among information sources and
recipients), need to be examined to understand social
influence processes in this context. Finally, paralinguis-
tic cues (e.g., emojis, likes, etc.) should be examined as
markers of endorsement, signals of alternative motiva-
tions (e.g., sarcasm), and cues demonstrating the extent
of shared group identity, all of whichmay be interrelated
in complex ways to affect misinformation belief.
In sum, insights into the wide range of motivations
for sharing misinformation via social media suggest that
the spread of misinformation should be viewed as a
dynamic process among active users driven by a wide
range of factors. Viewed this way, the negative aspects
of misinformation may to some degree be mitigated and
can only be fully understood as future research incorpo-
rates a more inclusive understanding of the various moti-
vations and strategies for sharingmisinformation socially
in large-scale online networks.
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